This paper studies the stopping problem for random vectors of p components which correspond to the payoffs to a group of p players. The observation proCt~SS is stopped at the first time when no less than r (1 ";;;'r";;;'p) players declare to stop. We call it a majority rule. TIle object of this paper is to find out a reasonable stopping strategy under a class of these rules, in both cases of finite and lnfinite decision horizons, We solve our stopping problem by introducing the concept of an equilibrium point in the non-cooperative game theory. Several examples including a variant of the secretary problem are given,
Introduction
In Section 2, we formulate the multi-variate stopping problem with this rule precisely by the concept of equilibrium points in the non-cooperative game theory(Nash [3] ). The finite horizon case is treated in Section 3. We derive a recursive relation of expected net gains and an equilibrium stopping strategy for each player. Sakaguchi [6] has already obtained the result in the case of the unanimity stopping rule, that is, p=r. In Section 4, we compute some examples of the majority stopping rule(p>r) for uniform and normal distribution cases in order to illustrate the equilibrium expected net gains.
A bivariate version of the secretary problem is investigated where each applicant has two abilities so that they are not totally ordered. Presman and Sonin [4] treat this with another stopping rule. They consider the model in which each player's decision does not affect the stopping of the process but his reward only. In the final section the infinite horizon case is considered, and we obtain an equilibrium equation which determines the equilibrium stopping strategy. An example of a uniform distribution case is given to get the majority level which maximizes the equilibrium expected net gain.
After writing the first draft of this paper, we received details of the similar work by Sakaguchi[7] and Kadane [2] . The structure of their problem is a multi-lateral sequential process in which decisions when to stop are made by the players alternately, instead of the simultaneous decision under a majority rule. Although our main result of the equilibrium stopping strategy is essentially identical to theirs of the optimal procedure, the formulation and analysis in this paper are different from [7] and [2] .
Statement of the problem
In this section we shall describe our stopping problem in terms of notati- for each OES, and we call i t ~ stoppi:!B. time generated by the SS o. The stopping time t (0) shows that the obs'~rvation process must be stopped at the first time such that the number of pla.yers who declare to stop, i.e., the column sum of a matrix 0, is greater '~han or equal to the majority level r.
The expected net gain for player i is
where yi=Xi_c i (1~_i~_p)(n=1,2,000). is called an equilibrium SS if Cleary the left-hand side of (2.5) is equal to player its net gain. By Lemma 2.2, he will declare to stop when {xi~vi} occurs according to his own profit Xi only, independently of the stopping events of other players, so as to maximize his expected net gain. 
Here each *~~i}(k) is defined, simila~ly as in Section 2, by the events
Then we can state the following '~heorem. Proof: Denote t*=t(*o) for simplicity. We use backward induction on n.
Suppose that
*a > r}, we have n ::
Since *B =*A n*G r-l +*A 11 *G :r and by Lemma 2.2, n n n n n
showing that (3.4) is true for n-l. Since (3.4) is trivially true for n=O, the latter part of the theorem is proved.
Nextly we shall show *0 is an equilibrium SS. It suffices to show that for any given i, say i=l, 
from the definition of ol{n}. Let Al={ol=l} and *Ai={*oi=l} for iFl. A stoppn n n n ing event B of the process with respect to A l ,*A 2 , ••• ,*A P for player 1 is n n n n represented by B = Aln *G{I} (r-l) + :
by (3.4), lemma 2.2 and (3.1). The above equality holds when ~ = *0 1 n n Therefore, from the definition of 0tn_l}' t*=t{n-l} on {t*~nl, we have
The assumption (b) is inessential. Namely, the reward X at the n-th n stage may depend on the previous Xl,···,X n _ l . A similar recursive relation as Remark The second terms in thE' bracket of (3.1) are zero for the unanimity case(p=r), and hence (3.1) coincilies with (11) of Sakaguchi [5] . We also
. with a common random variable "n n' , n ' 1 P T X=(X ""'X) and C=O, (3.1) and (3.2) 
Examples
Example 4.1.
( 1 p)T Let X = X ••• X n=l,,"',N be independent, identically disn n' , n tributed and C = O. Sakaguchi [6] gave examples of the unanimity rule(p=r=2)
for bivariate uniform and normal distributions. Here we shall discuss the majority case(p~r).
(i) If ~""'X; are independent and identically uniformly distributed on (0,1) for each n, then the values for the players are equal, so we set v = n p(~~~(r-l)I~_n) = P(g~~~(r-l)) = (~=i)(l-Vn)r-1V;-r, P(G~~~(r)I~_n) = L~:;(P~l)(l-Vn)kV;-k-l, 
The graphs of the values v for p=5 and r=1,2,···,5 are shown in Figure   n 4.1. If the majority level r is low (i.e., r=1,2), the players get small values of v .
n Since each player is strongly affected by the "forced stopping" in the low majority level, he must stop so early that his value is small. I f the level r is high (i.e., r=4,5), this affect is weakened and therefore he gets a large value. When the number n of observations is sufficiently large, the unanimity case(i.e.,r=5) has the highest value. The rule of unanimity perhaps brings an inevitable "cooperative nature" to the non-cooperative problem.
When n is less than about 10 3 , the majority case(r=3,4) is more desirable than other cases. Probably there is no enough time to wait until the unani- Table 4 .2, the value w increases as the n correlation coefficient p increases for a fixed n. If p is highly negative (P=-O.7), the value of the majority case becomes very small. Intuitively speaking, the process is forced to stop so early because of the conflict of interests between the two players. usually corresponds only one ability and so a group of girls is totally ordered. We consider the situation where an executive interviews a group of girls one by one with respect to two kind of abilities. For example, one is a skill of type-writing(ability 1) and the other is a profieiency in a certain foreign language(ability 2). He considers both abilities equitably and would like to choose the girl who is best in either ability. That is, there exist two objectives in himself: One is that the accepted girl should be best in ability 1 (say, player 1) and the other is that she should be best in ability 2(say, player 2). The above situation is also equivalent to the next. Two professors want to choose one secretary from N girls. Professor 1, 2 wants to choose a best girl in ability 1, 2 respectively. They interview girls one by one and immediately decide whether to accept or not. If one of two professors say "yes", then the girl is accepted. Each professor wishes to maximize the probability of his win, that is, to choose the best girl referring to the corresponding ability. These two situations are formulated as our non-cooperative stopping problem with a majority rule (p,r)=(2,1).
We assume that girls appear one by one at random without recall as in the ordinary problem, and that there is no dependency between the two abilities. and *oi=O, otherwise (i=1,2). Where'f 's satisfy, from (3.1) and (3.2),
and vI =l/N. That is, *oi is a rule which observes until the (m*-l)th stage and accepts the first girl who is the best in ability i among all girls previously appeared.
The number m* is determined by the smallest m such that (4.11)
Thus we have, from (4.7), (4.12)
Taking a limit as N. 0+00, it is seen that lim m*/N exists and equals O.
N-+oo
Also its expected equilibrium value equals O. A numerical example shows Table 4 .3.
Refering to this result, the limiting expected value is degenerated. Indeed, between the conflict of two players, once an opponent declares to stop, the other has no chance to win even if it appears the best girl at a later time. In the Presman and Sonin's model [4] , the process continues to the last and there is a chance to win after an opponent declares to stop. So the observation-interval is longer and the limiting expected value is a strict positive number.
For comparison, consider the unanimity rule (p,r)=(2,2) in which two players must agree to stop. The recurrence relation (3.1) becomes
From this, we have In this rule,it must appear the best girl for both players at a same time in order to win the game. The probability of this event is so small that the expected value tends to degenerate. See Table 4 .3.
Remark: A one-stage look ahead (OLA) policy by Ross[5] derives explicit optimal policies in a stopping problem. We see that, in this equilibrium case, the OLA policy can be applied. To show that the SS *a is an equilibrium SS, we will prepare the following truncated game. The next lemma is easily verified by a result of Chow, Robbins and
Siegmund [1] since the number p is finite. The root of (5.7) gives the expected equilibrium value as in Theorem 5.3.
Nextly we obtain the majority level r* which maximizes the equilibrium expected net gain v for any fixed p. Denote the left-hand side of (5.7)
by fr(v). Then we easily find that, for each r, 
